Previously the outline designs for the majority of submarines and warships were developed by the MoD’s own naval architects in Bath who acted as design authority and project overseers, managing risks and expenditure with a very hands-on approach. GEC Marconi as the prime contractor was responsible for both the design, manufacture and performance of the boats. In a conspiracy of optimism, the contractor promised the MoD HMS Astute would be delivered by 2005. The contract was finally awarded in June 1997 for the first 3 submarines valued at £2.8Bn including 4 years in-service support for the first two boats. This created uncertainty at Barrow with RR and AMEC also withdrawing while the expertise of the assembled teams began to disperse as the government dithered over the contract award. GEC Marconi was selected as the preferred bidder in June 1995 but GEC were also allowed to buy out VSEL. The contenders were the GEC Marconi-led consortium comprising BMT, AMEC, Rolls Royce and Kockums (Swedish conventional submarine builders) against Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited (VSEL), owners of the Barrow shipyard. B2TC would eventually evolve into the Astute class.Īn invitation to build the first 3 boats was issued in July 1994. Instead in June 1991, a £6m contract was awarded to develop a Batch II Trafalgar-class Batch II (B2TC) to an industry team comprising VSEL, British Aerospace, Marconi and Rolls Royce. Like many similar defence cooperation attempts with the French, it was found not to be practical as requirements and philosophy were too divergent. It was quickly realised that buying from the US would work out far more costly and would damage the UK submarine construction industry and the critical strategic ability to build deterrent submarines. This was the first of a series of decisions that combined to leave a problematic legacy for the RN submarine service.Īn attempt to build a cheaper/simpler submarine than SSN20 was started and the Government flirted with the idea of buying off the shelf from the US or a joint programme with the French navy. The end of the Cold War and the 1990 “Options for Change” defence review brought the SSN20 programme to a sudden halt as politicians scrambled to cut defence spending to reap the so-called “peace dividend”. The W class were intended as a high-end boat that would far outclass the Soviet navy’s best (in a similar vein to the US Navy’s Seawolf class) and cost constraints were not a major factor. By 1989 approval had been given for detailed design work to start on the new class which were now referred to as ‘SSN20’ and would have had names starting with ‘W’ (following the ‘V’ used by the Vanguard class). In 1980, the project was suspended as the design teams needed to focus on the Vanguard class SSBNs but in 1984 work resumed on what was now called the follow-on SSN (FOSSN). In the late 1970s planners began to consider what would replace the Swiftsure class and began concept development for ‘SSN0Z’. These were followed by the 7 Trafalgar class boats, arguably one of the best Cold War SSN designs, delivered to the fleet through the 1980s on time and with an average construction time of about 50 months. Propelled by a regular drumbeat of construction and development, by the early 1980s it had built the Dreadnought, Valiant, Churchill and Swiftsure classes. In the late 1960s the RN had decided that it would invest heavily in nuclear attack submarines with a force goal of 20 boats, seen as the new capital ships of the day and the most effective weapons to counter Soviet maritime threat. In the first of a series of articles focussing on the Astute class SSNs, we look at the programme’s history and how decisions made decades ago continue to impact today’s fleet.
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